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RETROACTIVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
ANNA RAPHAEL†
ABSTRACT
When German tennis star Boris Becker attempted to become a diplomat
of the Central African Republic in 2018 to avoid bankruptcy proceedings
in the United Kingdom, much of the world ridiculed his efforts. But his
actions begged a genuine question: Can an individual become a diplomat
so that his or her past actions are immunized from prosecution or suit, even
after the actions have occurred or court proceedings have been instituted?
In the United States, the answer appears to be yes. On at least two
occasions, federal courts have allowed such retroactive applications of
diplomatic immunity in cases involving allegations ranging from false
imprisonment to mistreatment of domestic workers. Presumably under the
political question doctrine, these courts reasoned that they must defer to
the executive branch on issues of foreign affairs and on State Department
certifications of diplomatic immunity, in particular. These courts did not
review the factual contexts of the cases, which would have illuminated that
the individuals in question were not actually diplomats, would be unlikely
to ever act as diplomats, and seemingly had obtained diplomatic status
solely for the purpose of evading suit or prosecution.
This Note argues that the purposes of diplomatic immunity, analogies
to other forms of immunity like presidential immunity, and the potential for
unfettered abuse all cut against the retroactive application of diplomatic
immunity. Courts need not dismiss cases as nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine solely because a case involves a question of
diplomatic status. Rather, courts should narrowly tailor the judicially
developed political question doctrine when legitimate issues as to the
factual and legal validity of a defendant’s diplomatic position arise.
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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, foreign diplomats enjoy full immunity from both
civil and criminal liability, meaning they cannot be arrested or detained, their
real and personal property cannot be searched, and they are not subject to the
jurisdiction of domestic courts.1 In light of this immunity, one might think
that diplomats exploit their positions and threaten the safety of American
citizens. Indeed, complaints of diplomats taking advantage of their status
permeate the media.2 But such abuse is not particularly widespread, and
diplomats rarely commit violent crimes.3 Regardless of whether criticism of
diplomatic immunity is generally valid, there is an even more brazen
potential for abuse that must be addressed. The current U.S. legal regime
permits a seldom-discussed retroactive application of diplomatic immunity,
meaning that an individual can commit a crime, obtain diplomatic status, and
then have that immunity “shield” the individual from liability for those
wrongful actions taken before the individual obtained such status.4
Consider the following troubling hypothetical application of retroactive
diplomatic immunity: Monsieur Rich is a wealthy foreign national living in
the United States. Monsieur Rich launders money, which is a federal crime
under the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.5 After Monsieur Rich
finds out that he is being investigated for money laundering, he proceeds to
call his old buddy Madame Shady, who works at the foreign ministry in a
country that ranks highly on the list of most corrupt countries in the world.
Monsieur Rich explains the situation to Madame Shady and asks if there are
any diplomatic openings available to him. Madame Shady replies: “Of
course, we always need attachés.” Madame Shady proceeds to communicate
Monsieur Rich’s new diplomatic status to the U.S. State Department, which
in turn certifies Monsieur Rich’s status. When the U.S. Department of Justice
indicts Monsieur Rich for money laundering, Monsieur Rich moves to
dismiss on the ground that he is immune from prosecution. Because courts

1. See infra Part I.B (providing an overview of diplomatic privileges and immunities).
2. See infra note 70 (discussing newsworthy cases).
3. See infra Part I.C (noting that abuse of immunity is usually confined to traffic violations).
4. See infra Part II (explaining the legality of retroactive diplomatic immunity). Although the
concept of retroactive diplomatic immunity has seldom been discussed in legal scholarship, it has been
mentioned in the mainstream press. See Alison Frankel, Retroactive Immunity for the Consul?, CHI. TRIB.
(Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-12-19-sns-rt-us-column-frankel20131218-story.html [https://perma.cc/HRR4-75S8] (“It’s a rare but not unprecedented State Department
device to grant foreign officials full immunity for their actions even if they weren’t entitled to such broad
protection when they committed the supposed misconduct.”).
5. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2018).
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generally defer to the State Department on the issue of an individual’s
diplomatic status,6 Monsieur Rich gets off scot-free.
Although this hypothetical may appear farfetched, it is actually on the
tamer side of the few documented cases. Federal courts have twice
approached the issue of retroactive diplomatic immunity in cases that
involved allegations of false imprisonment, visa fraud, and mistreatment of
domestic workers.7 In both cases, the federal courts declined to question the
State Department’s certification of diplomatic status, despite the fact that the
individuals were not diplomats at the time of their alleged wrongdoing or
even, in one case, when the suit commenced.8
The problem with nondiplomats9 abusing diplomatic immunity is not
constrained to evading serious crimes committed in the United States. Unlike
actual diplomats, nondiplomats seemingly would not have a foreign
government to answer to. Although foreign diplomats are not subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, they typically remain subject to the jurisdiction of their sending
state.10 But for wealthy and connected nondiplomats, diplomatic immunity
may be seen as a means of escaping prosecution or suit in any jurisdiction,
presumably without the fear of facing repercussions in the very sending state
that corruptly provided their status in the first place.11 It is unlikely that a
foreign government willing to issue an individual a diplomatic position after
violating U.S. law would then prosecute that individual for the same
wrongdoing. And because federal courts have long refused to review
certifications of an individual’s diplomatic status under the political question
doctrine, once such a status is obtained, these nondiplomats may abuse it
without any sending state’s bona fide supervision, meaning that any
wrongdoing may go undetected. This not only goes against the very purpose
of diplomatic immunity,12 but also is unique in the sense that no other form
of immunity, including presidential immunity, may be granted

6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See generally Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cty., 741 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). These cases are discussed further infra Part II.B.
8. Id.
9. For the purpose of this Note, “nondiplomats” are defined as individuals who seek diplomatic
status after committing a wrongdoing, for the purpose of evading suit or prosecution, and without actually
performing or intending to perform any diplomatic functions.
10. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part II.C (discussing a high-profile example). It should be noted that, likely because
of the surreptitious nature of retroactive diplomatic immunity, public examples are sparse. But this does
not necessarily indicate the actual number of cases. The fact that retroactive diplomatic immunity is so
rarely discussed—especially in legal scholarship, where no author has deeply examined the subject—
necessitates this Note.
12. See infra Part II.A.
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retroactively.13 Federal courts therefore should not allow retroactive
diplomatic immunity to persist solely in the name of deference to the
executive branch under the political question doctrine.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I details the history and
development of modern U.S. diplomatic immunity, from its early origins to
the codification of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961
and the current doctrine. It explains the privileges and immunities accorded
to foreign diplomats in the United States, the process of obtaining diplomatic
immunity, and the limits on immunity that were developed to curb abuse.
Part II argues that the purpose of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, analogies to other forms of immunity, and the potential for abuse
cut against the concept of retroactive diplomatic immunity. However,
because courts have repeatedly refused to review State Department
certifications of immunity under the auspices of the political question
doctrine, retroactive diplomatic immunity lives on. Part III considers several
possible solutions to this problem, concluding that the judiciary should
narrowly construe the political question doctrine when an individual’s
diplomatic status is a genuine issue of fact and law.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
For centuries, diplomatic privileges and immunities persisted solely
under customary international law.14 It was not until 1961, with the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, that the first comprehensive treaty on
diplomatic law came into being.15 Part I traces the history leading up to the
Vienna Convention, its international ratification, and its eventual
codification in the United States. It explains the scope of privileges and
immunities accorded to diplomats under the Vienna Convention, along with
the principal rationales behind these immunities. It then discusses how
individuals obtain diplomatic immunity and the extent to which laws have
been enacted to curb its potential for abuse.

13. See infra Part II.D (explaining that presidential immunity, qualified immunity, and defense
witness immunity may not be applied retroactively).
14. Customary international law is one of two principal forms of public international law. CURTIS
A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW xxv (6th ed. 2017). Unlike a written
treaty, customary international law arises from the “general practices and beliefs of nations,” meaning
that it does not exist unless “nations have consistently followed a particular practice out of a sense of
legal obligation.” Id. For an overview of how customary international law works in federal courts, see
generally Ryan M. Scoville, Finding Customary International Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1893 (2016).
15. See infra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (discussing the Vienna Convention).
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A. Background
Diplomatic immunity has existed in some form or another stretching
back to antiquity.16 During the Roman Empire, for example, “a messenger
from a foreign territory was generally allowed to complete his mission
without the fear of interference.”17 And long before diplomatic law was ever
codified, countries observed the personal inviolability of diplomats.18 The
establishment and expansion of permanent embassies further solidified the
existence of diplomatic immunity,19 which at the time persisted primarily
under customary international practice.20
Various theories have been proposed to justify the existence of
diplomatic immunities and privileges, but three have drawn the most
widespread acceptance: the theories of personal representation,
extraterritoriality, and functional necessity.21 The theory of personal
representation finds its greatest support in ancient history and relays the
concept that “the diplomatic agent is the personification of his ruler or of a
sovereign state whose independence must be respected.”22 The foreign envoy
was seen as “sacrosanct,”23 holding a character of religious importance,
much like the royal prince.24 But the theory of personal representation has

16. J. CRAIG BARKER, THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A NECESSARY
EVIL? 14 (1996) (“The roots of diplomatic law lie buried in ancient history . . . .”).
17. Id. at 33.
18. See id. at 32, 71 (“[T]he inviolability of the person of the diplomatic agent was probably the
first principle of diplomatic law and remains the most fundamental today.”). As early as 700 B.C., Roman
ambassadors were said to have been accorded personal inviolability. MONTELL OGDON, JURIDICAL
BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE ORIGIN, GROWTH AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW 16–17
(1936).
19. See BARKER, supra note 16, at 34–35 (“It was not until the establishment of permanent
diplomatic relations . . . that the need for comprehensive enumeration of diplomatic privileges and
immunities arose.”); EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 7 (4th ed. 2016) (noting that states did not typically need to establish
diplomatic relations until the creation of permanent missions).
20. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR IMMUNITY: GUIDANCE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES 1 (1998) [hereinafter DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE].
21. See CLIFTON E. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 1 (1967) (noting that
scholars have “consistently turned to one of [these] three traditional theories”). Some scholars use the
terms “extraterritoriality” and “exterritoriality” interchangeably. See Extraterritoriality, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/extraterritoriality [https://perma.cc/8SKH-M9XH]
(noting the two words as synonyms).
22. WILSON, supra note 21, at 1.
23. DENZA, supra note 19, at 213.
24. See OGDON, supra note 18, at 8 (“[A]mbassadors were sacred and inviolable . . . because they
represented a foreign prince.”). Some argue that this “cloak of religious sanctity” was likely just a means
of “guarantee[ing] against harm being done to persons who were regarded as fulfilling an essential role
in society.” BARKER, supra note 16, at 34.
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lost much of its luster following the American and French Revolutions, with
the fall of divine monarchies and the rise of modern democracies.25 The
theory also draws criticism for its failure to address why diplomats should
be accorded immunities for their unofficial acts, wherein they are not
generally thought of as representing the sovereign.26
Under the theory of extraterritoriality, foreign diplomats are considered
mere passersby unencumbered by local laws.27 The diplomatic property is
thought of as belonging to the foreign jurisdiction rather than to the local
jurisdiction.28 This legal fiction follows the idea “that the ambassador must
be treated as if he still is living in the territory of the sending state”29 and is
therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state.
The theory of functional necessity—likely the strongest of the three—
stands for the proposition that diplomats must be free to move safely between
jurisdictions and be immune from local jurisdictions so as to conduct
diplomacy effectively and facilitate international discourse.30 Without the
ability to travel freely and independently, a diplomat would not be able to
perform his or her duties properly.31 Diplomacy would be unworkable if
diplomats were unable to communicate with their sending country securely
or if receiving states were able to “open diplomatic bags and read their
contents, listen to their telephone calls, hack into diplomats’ e-mails,” and
so forth.32 Judge Richard J. Cardamone of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit aptly summarized the safety diplomatic immunity provides
to American diplomats abroad under the current framework:
25. See WILSON, supra note 21, at 4 (“The concept [of personal representation] was somewhat more
difficult to accept, even theoretically, after sovereign authority was transferred to the people, especially
in presidential systems where rule-making is shared by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.”).
François Laurent, an early nineteenth-century critic of diplomatic immunity found this basis to represent
“the fetishism of royalty and the arrogance of the prince” and the “voice of a time past.” LINDA S. FREY
& MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 339 (1999) (quotations and citations
omitted).
26. See WILSON, supra note 21, at 4 (“Since the theory of personal representation fails to extend a
foundation for immunity to private acts, it must be rejected . . . .”).
27. See id. at 5 (describing two ways in which the theory explains diplomatic immunity).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 6–7.
30. Id. at 17; see also Veronica L. Maginnis, Note, Limiting Diplomatic Immunity: Lessons Learned
from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
989, 995 (2005) (describing functional necessity as “the most accepted theory for the justification of
diplomatic immunity”).
31. See BARKER, supra note 16, at 224 (“It would seem that the requirement that the individual
diplomat is left free to perform his functions independently and efficiently has always been part of the
justification behind the granting of diplomatic privileges and immunities.”).
32. Brian Barder, A Former Diplomat’s Reflections on the Vienna Convention, in DIPLOMATIC LAW
IN A NEW MILLENNIUM 16 (Paul Behrens ed., 2017).
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The risk in creating an exception to mission inviolability in this country is
of course that American missions abroad would be exposed to incursions
that are legal under a foreign state’s law. Foreign law might be vastly
different from our own, and might provide few, if any, substantive or
procedural protections for American diplomatic personnel . . . . Recent
history is unfortunately replete with examples demonstrating how fragile is
the security for American diplomats and personnel in foreign countries;
their safety is a matter of real and continuing concern.33

Supporters of the functional-necessity theory find it especially relevant in
times of war, when “[i]n the midst of hostilities it is necessary to send
ambassadors to make overtures of peace or to propose measures tending to
moderate the horrors of war.”34 Critics argue that this theory is anachronistic
in a world with modern technology that enables governments to conduct
foreign diplomacy from just about anywhere, enabling wholesale avoidance
of hostilities.35
Despite the long tradition of diplomatic immunity under customary
international law, it was not until the early eighteenth century that the British
Parliament formally acknowledged it by making the arrest of foreign
diplomats unlawful.36 The U.S. Congress passed a similar law in 1790,
providing for absolute criminal and civil immunity for foreign diplomats,
their family members and servants, and diplomatic-mission staff.37 The 1790
Act made it a crime for an American to arrest or even attempt to sue any
foreign diplomat or “foreign national[] connected in any capacity with a
diplomatic mission located in the United States.”38 That legal landscape
lasted for almost two centuries but drew significant criticism for its lack of

33. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire to the U.N., 988 F.2d
295, 300–01 (2d Cir. 1993). Altering the immunities granted to foreign diplomats in the United States
would likely threaten the safety of U.S. diplomats working abroad because countries largely rely on
reciprocal grants of diplomatic immunity. See Bradley Larschan, The Abisinito Affair: A Restrictive
Theory of Diplomatic Immunity?, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 286 (1988) (“Obviously, host States
count on reciprocal immunity for their diplomats abroad.”).
34. OGDON, supra note 18, at 10; see also GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY:
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, PROBLEMS 184 (1989) (“Immunity has enabled diplomats to work abroad with
the peace of mind required for success in performing difficult tasks in a sometimes hostile environment.”).
35. See, e.g., William G. Morris, Note, Constitutional Solutions to the Problem of Diplomatic Crime
and Immunity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 635 (2007) (“Given increased technological innovations, the
ability of leaders to interact has grown enormously and has decreased the necessity of posting diplomats
abroad.”).
36. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 2 (“In 1708 the British Parliament
formally recognized diplomatic immunity and banned the arrest of foreign envoys.”).
37. Id.
38. R. Scott Garley, Note, Compensation for “Victims” of Diplomatic Immunity in the United
States: A Claims Fund Proposal, 4 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 135, 139 (1980).
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safeguards and capacity for abuse.39 Starting in the twentieth century, the
international community began pushing for a more restrictive form of
diplomatic immunity that would protect the functions of a diplomat but not
the diplomat in his or her individual capacity,40 leading to the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961.
A general formulation of diplomatic law, the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations “was largely a reaction to the unlimited immunity
historically granted to diplomats” under customary international law.41 On
April 18, 1961, thirty-four nations signed onto the Vienna Convention,42
laying out what would later become the framework for diplomatic privileges
and immunities in almost every country.43 No prior attempt at universalizing
diplomatic relations had come close to the widespread adoption of the
Vienna Convention.44
Although the United States signed the Vienna Convention in 1961, it
did not come into force in the United States until December 13, 1972.45
Furthermore, Congress did not codify the Vienna Convention by passing the
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 for another six years.46 In addition to
codifying the Vienna Convention, the Diplomatic Relations Act repealed the
1790 Act, required diplomats to carry liability insurance, and created a
substantive right of action for injured parties to file suit directly against the

39. See id. at 139–40 (explaining that many nations found absolute diplomatic immunity overly
broad because it effectively stripped citizens of any legal remedy for harms caused by diplomats and
others).
40. Id. at 141.
41. Mitchell S. Ross, Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches To
Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 4 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 173, 180 (1989).
42. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
[hereinafter Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations]; see Privileges and Immunities, Diplomatic
and Consular Relations, Etc., U.N. TREATY COLLECTION [hereinafter U.N. TREATY COLLECTION],
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iii-3&chapter=3&lang=en
[https://perma.cc/A37E-N79K] (listing parties to the Vienna Convention).
43. See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 42 (noting 192 parties to the Convention).
44. See DENZA, supra note 19, at 2–3 (“None of the earlier attempts at multilateral codification—
the Vienna Regulation of 1815[,] . . . the Resolutions adopted by the Institute of International Law in
1895 and 1929, the Harvard Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of 1932—had
covered the field so thoroughly.”).
45. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS ACT iii (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS ACT].
46. Id. For purposes of this Note, the controlling law on diplomatic immunity in the United States
will be referred to as the Vienna Convention rather than the Diplomatic Relations Act, as the Diplomatic
Relations Act simply states that persons entitled to diplomatic immunity in the United States “enjoy the
privileges and immunities specified in the Vienna Convention.” 22 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2018).
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insurer when the foreign diplomat enjoys civil immunity.47 These additions
addressed what Congress viewed as the principal abuse of diplomatic
immunity: diplomats’ lack of accountability for traffic-accident injuries.48
B. Privileges and Immunities Accorded to Foreign Diplomats in the
United States
Under the Vienna Convention, unlike the 1790 Act, not every foreign
national connected to a diplomatic mission is entitled to complete immunity.
The Vienna Convention delineates three categories of foreign nationals:
diplomatic agents, administrative and technical staff, and service staff.49
Diplomatic agents and their family members are entitled to “the highest
degree of privileges and immunities,”50 including personal inviolability,
immunity from criminal jurisdiction, immunity from civil jurisdiction, and
immunity from being compelled to testify in court.51 Administrative and
technical staff of diplomatic missions and their family members are entitled
to immunities and privileges identical to those of diplomatic agents in all
respects except for civil immunity.52 Administrative and technical staff enjoy
functional immunity from civil suits, meaning that only acts connected with
official mission duties are immune from liability.53 Service-staff members
possess official-acts immunity, but carry no personal inviolability,
inviolability of property, or immunity from being compelled to testify in
court.54 Unlike diplomatic agents and administrative and technical staff, the
family members of service staff maintain absolutely no privileges or
immunities.55

47. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 45, at 31.
48. See, e.g., id. at 29 (noting that “[p]erhaps the most dramatic of . . . incidents” the Diplomatic
Relations Act was meant to address “have involved automobile accidents in which American citizens not
at fault have suffered enormous damage and injury but have been unable to collect any compensation”
(statement of Sen. Paul Sarbanes)).
49. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 4–5.
50. Id. Diplomatic immunity extends only to certain family members, including the diplomat’s
spouse.
Privileges and
Immunities,
U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://www.state.gov/ofm/
accreditation/privilegesandimmunities/index.htm [https://perma.cc/H2MF-YH7J]. Diplomatic immunity
also extends to the diplomat’s unmarried children who are under the age of twenty-one, under the age of
twenty-three and attending a college or university full time, or who have physical or mental disabilities.
Id.
51. Diplomatic and Consular Immunity, U.S. DIPLOMACY, http://www.usdiplomacy.org/
diplomacytoday/law/immunity.php [https://perma.cc/VW6L-8ZLK].
52. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 5.
53. Id. at 5. Because the family members of administrative and technical staff have no official
mission duties, they are not entitled to any immunity from civil suit. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Personal inviolability is the “cornerstone” of diplomatic law.56 Under
this privilege, diplomats may not be arrested, detained, or handcuffed.57
Diplomats similarly may not be compulsorily searched by law enforcement
officers.58 Neither the real nor personal property of the diplomatic mission
may be searched or seized.59 Relatedly, foreign diplomats are also immune
from both civil and criminal jurisdiction in the United States, meaning that
any action brought against such an individual must be dismissed.60 Although
the Vienna Convention lays out no particular procedure for raising the
defense of diplomatic immunity in civil cases,61 courts have in practice
granted a defendant diplomat’s motion to dismiss when supported with a
State Department certification attesting to the diplomat’s status.62 But the
majority of cases involving individuals entitled to diplomatic immunity
never see the courtroom, as many potential plaintiffs abandon suit once they
learn of the diplomat’s immunity.63 However, in cases where diplomats
initiate suit, they waive their civil immunity in regard to any resulting
counterclaims.64
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoins the prosecution of
diplomats for any crime, however serious the offense may be.65 This
immunity largely works in tandem with the inviolability of a diplomat’s
person and property. Inviolability makes it especially challenging for
authorities not only to prove criminal misconduct, but also to detect it at the
outset.66 On the rare occasions officials do institute criminal actions against
diplomats, as with civil actions, courts dismiss the indictment. 67 That said,

56. BARKER, supra note 16, at 71.
57. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining that diplomatic agents
may not be handcuffed “except in extraordinary circumstances”).
58. DENZA, supra note 19, at 222.
59. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that diplomatic agents
“enjoy complete personal inviolability, which means that . . . neither their property (including vehicles)
nor residences may be entered or searched”).
60. E.g., Sabbithi v. Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 126 (D.D.C. 2009).
61. DENZA, supra note 19, at 255.
62. See, e.g., Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss after the State Department recognized defendant as an employee of the
Czechoslovakian Embassy); Fun v. Pulgar, 993 F. Supp. 2d 470, 473–74 (D.N.J. 2014) (dismissing the
plaintiff’s suit following State Department certification of defendant’s position as Counselor to the
Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations).
63. DENZA, supra note 19, at 255.
64. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 4–5.
65. Id. at 4.
66. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 128.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (dismissing an
indictment alleging, inter alia, visa fraud); see also Martina E. Vandenberg & Sarah Bessell, Diplomatic
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the opportunity to prosecute the alleged crime is not wholly lost, as criminal
immunity in the receiving state does not impede the possibility of
prosecution by the sending state.68 However, such prosecution is unlikely.69
C. Limiting Abuses of Diplomatic Immunity
Much of the concern about diplomatic immunity stems from its
presumed susceptibility to abuse. News headlines detailing diplomats getting
away with major crimes have likely factored significantly into this
opposition.70 Despite the extensive media coverage of the few egregious
cases, such cases are not especially common,71 and diplomats rarely commit
violent crimes.72 Recently, abuses have been restricted mostly to minor
infractions, such as parking offenses.73 One reason for this may be that the
Immunity and the Abuse of Domestic Workers: Criminal and Civil Remedies in the United States, 26
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 595, 598 (2016) (noting the rarity of criminal prosecution of diplomats in the
arena of domestic abuse, for example). On occasion, the government has also dropped charges against
diplomats of its own volition. See Richard Gonzales, Feds Drop Prosecution of 7 Turkish Bodyguards
Involved in Assault of Protesters, NPR (Mar. 22, 2018, 6:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/03/22/596227771/feds-drop-prosecution-of-7-turkish-bodyguards-involved-in-d-c-brawl
[https://perma.cc/HW7X-AAQ8] (dropping charges against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s
bodyguards for an assault allegedly committed against American protesters).
68. Ross, supra note 41, at 190.
69. See Steven Erlanger, Officials Defend Concept of Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7,
1997),
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/07/nyregion/officials-defend-concept-of-diplomaticimmunity.html [https://perma.cc/7NLC-RGYD] (“Almost invariably, . . . diplomats . . . [involved in
criminal] cases are called home by their governments, or expelled by the host government, and do not
face criminal charges.”). But see MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 136 (“[T]he diplomat’s knowledge of
possible prosecution by his own government can be an effective deterrent.”).
70. See BARKER, supra note 16, at 6–10 (describing the Da Silveira and Abisinito affairs as catalysts
for attempted reforms to diplomatic immunity).
71. See Erlanger, supra note 69 (“Serious cases themselves involving diplomats are relatively rare,
State Department officials said, with about 10 to 15 cases a year that are nearly all questions of shoplifting
or drunken driving, and usually involve the dependents of diplomats.”); see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 45, at 31 (“Most of the diplomats who are our friends
and neighbors are scrupulous in avoiding abuse of this [diplomatic] privilege, but sadly a minority is not.”
(statement of Sen. Charles Mathias)).
72. See David Usborne, Can a Diplomat Get Away with Murder?, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 1997,
1:02
AM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/can-a-diplomat-get-away-with-murder1282444.html [https://perma.cc/WHY4-YEB8] (calculating that in 1995, out of the eighteen thousand
individuals entitled to diplomatic immunity, “less than one tenth of one per cent were involved in serious
crime”). As a comparison, in 1995, the United States had a total violent-crime rate almost seven times
higher than that of diplomats alone. See Crime in the United States, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crimein-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/BGW8-YWYT] (showing a
general population violent-crime rate of approximately 0.68 percent).
73. See Elizabeth Bumiller, Diplomats Make No Apologies for Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13,
1997),
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/13/nyregion/diplomats-make-no-apologies-forimmunity.html [https://perma.cc/W9XG-VB5M] (discussing the problem of diplomatic parking
violations). Examples of diplomatic parking offenses include “blocking fire hydrants” and leaving

RAPHAEL IN PRINTER FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/20/2020 11:19 AM

1436

[Vol. 69:1425

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Vienna Convention—supplemented by state practice—implemented two
limiting mechanisms to curb abuse, namely waiver of diplomatic immunity
and designation of a diplomat as persona non grata.
When the federal government wishes to prosecute a foreign diplomat
but cannot due to the diplomat’s immunity, the prosecution can request that
the foreign government waive the diplomat’s immunity.74 The U.S. State
Department’s official position is that it will request a waiver whenever “the
prosecutor advises that he or she would prosecute but for immunity.”75 The
practice of waiver derives from one of the primary ambitions of the Vienna
Convention: protecting diplomacy and the diplomat’s functions, rather than
the diplomat as an individual.76 The United States has had mixed results in
securing waivers.77 Elements factoring into these variable outcomes include
the state of relations with the sending country,78 the severity of the alleged
crime,79 the amount of evidence supporting the allegation,80 and the potential
public outcry in the sending state were a waiver to be granted.81
Likely the most famous case of waiver involved Georgian diplomat
Gueorgui Makharadze, who struck and killed an American teenager while
driving under the influence in Washington, D.C.82 Anger over the sixteenyear-old’s death spread through Capitol Hill, and New Hampshire Senator
Judd Gregg called upon President Bill Clinton to suspend the $30 million in

millions of dollars’ worth of parking tickets unpaid. Ray Sanchez, Diplomats Owe $17 Mln in New York
Parking Fines, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2011, 5:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-un-finesnewyork/diplomats-owe-17-mln-in-new-york-parking-fines-idUSLNE78N00D20110924
[https://perma.cc/F283-L3XQ].
74. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, art. 32.
75. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 14.
76. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
77. See Erlanger, supra note 69 (noting that waiver is granted about half the time).
78. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (demonstrating the importance of diplomatic
relations in granting a waiver).
79. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (granting waiver following a teenage girl’s death
in a drunk driving accident when the driver was driving seventy-four miles per hour in a twenty-fivemile-per-hour zone).
80. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 14 (stating the State Department’s
ability to get a waiver depends “to a large degree on the strength (and documentation) of the case at
issue”).
81. See Ellen Barry & Benjamin Weiser, As Indian Diplomat Exits After Arrest, a Culture Clash
Lingers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/world/asia/indian-diplomatflies-home-after-indictment-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/A6LN-J5L6] (explaining the tension arising from
the arrest of an Indian foreign official and India’s refusal to grant a waiver).
82. Charlie Savage, Pakistan Case Tests Laws on Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/asia/23immunity.html [https://perma.cc/MPQ3YCBW]; Usborne, supra note 72.
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aid sent to Georgia annually.83 Although there was little doubt that the State
Department would formally request a waiver, most did not expect the
Georgian government to comply.84 But Georgia did waive Makharadze’s
immunity, and he was then prosecuted and pled guilty to involuntary
manslaughter.85 In making this decision, Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze noted that he considered the “seriousness” of the accident,
Makharadze’s “obvious” guilt, and a wish not to obstruct U.S. efforts to
prosecute Makharadze.86 The Georgian government also emphasized its
interest in maintaining friendly relations with the United States.87
When a sending state denies a request for waiver of diplomatic
immunity, the United States may designate a diplomat persona non grata,88
meaning that the individual is “unacceptable” or unwelcome in the receiving
state.89 Following a persona non grata designation, the diplomat is expelled
from the receiving state.90 This does not permit the diplomat’s prosecution—
as he or she does not lose diplomatic status—just their ability to remain in
the receiving state.91 The Vienna Convention requires no formal procedure
or evidence to support such a determination, leaving this measure entirely up
to the discretion of the U.S. State Department.92 In practice, the United States
has seldom utilized this tool, seemingly due to its potential adverse effects
on diplomatic relations.93

83. Usborne, supra note 72.
84. Id.
85. Savage, supra note 82.
86. Michael Janofsky, Georgian Diplomat Pleads Guilty in Death of Teen-Age Girl, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/09/us/georgian-diplomat-pleads-guilty-in-death-ofteen-age-girl.html [https://perma.cc/32LB-TM4X].
87. See Steven Lee Myers, Georgia Prepared To Waive Immunity of a Top Diplomat, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 11, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/11/us/georgia-prepared-to-waive-immunity-of-atop-diplomat.html [https://perma.cc/4BG5-9MDL] (“Georgia has acceded to the deep concerns of the
United States . . . and therefore is prepared to waive immunity in this case in the interest of U.S.-Georgian
relations . . . .” (statement of the Georgian Embassy to the United States)).
88. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, art. 9.
89. DENZA, supra note 19, at 49.
90. Ross, supra note 41, at 188.
91. Presidential Power To Expel Diplomatic Personnel from the United States, 4A Op. O.L.C. 207,
207 (1980) [hereinafter Presidential Power To Expel Diplomatic Personnel].
92. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, art. 9(1) (explaining that the
host state may designate a diplomat persona non grata “at any time and without having to explain its
decision”).
93. Ross, supra note 41, at 188. But see Laurel Wamsley, U.S. Expels 60 Russian Officials, Closes
Consulate in Seattle, NPR (Mar. 26, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/03/26/596966272/us-expels-dozens-of-russian-diplomats-closes-consulate-in-seattle
[https://perma.cc/U592-DB7W] (designating sixty Russian officials personae non gratae and closing the
Russian consulate in Seattle after the poisoning of a former Russian spy and his daughter in England).

RAPHAEL IN PRINTER FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/20/2020 11:19 AM

1438

[Vol. 69:1425

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

II. THE LEGALITY OF A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY
This Part argues that the purpose of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations and its codification in the Diplomatic Relations Act
cuts against a retroactive application of diplomatic immunity. Yet, federal
courts have repeatedly refused to make factual determinations regarding an
individual’s diplomatic status, instead choosing to defer to State Department
certifications under the political question doctrine. In this way, federal courts
have—at least indirectly—allowed the practice of retroactive diplomatic
immunity to stand on two occasions. After discussing these two cases, this
Part then explains that both retroactive diplomatic immunity and judicial
deference under the political question doctrine are ripe for abuse and
inconsistent with other forms of immunity present in the U.S. legal system,
including presidential immunity, qualified immunity, and defense witness
immunity.
A. Retroactive Diplomatic Immunity Under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations
The Vienna Convention does not address retroactive diplomatic
immunity.94 In debating the Diplomatic Relations Act more than a decade
after the United States signed the Vienna Convention, not a single member
of Congress appeared to anticipate retroactive diplomatic immunity.95
Rather, congresspersons were primarily concerned with requiring diplomats
to have a certain level of liability insurance to compensate victims of traffic
accidents.96 Members of Congress might have found a retroactive grant of
diplomatic immunity to be absurd because such a grant runs squarely afoul
of the Vienna Convention’s stated objective: “[T]he purpose of [diplomatic]
privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing

94. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42 (lacking any mention
of diplomatic immunity). For purposes of this Part, retroactive diplomatic immunity refers to the
phenomenon of an individual who is factually not a diplomat obtaining diplomatic status and its attendant
privileges and immunities for the purpose of immunizing past wrongful conduct.
95. See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 45
(lacking any mention of a retroactive application of diplomatic immunity).
96. See, e.g., id. at 29 (“Perhaps the most dramatic of [diplomatic] incidents have involved
automobile accidents in which American citizens not at fault have suffered enormous damage and injury
but have been unable to collect any compensation whatever. The whole burden of the accident has fallen
on its innocent victim.” (statement of Sen. Paul Sarbanes)).
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States[.]”97 A retroactive grant of immunity serves the individual—not
diplomatic functions—because the individual was not a diplomat and
therefore had no official functions when the alleged wrongful conduct
occurred. Granting diplomatic immunity for the purpose of evading a lawsuit
or criminal prosecution in no way promotes the Vienna Convention’s other
stated purpose of “maintain[ing] . . . international peace and security, and the
promotion of friendly relations among nations.”98
Retroactive diplomatic immunity is similarly inconsistent with the
historic rationales for diplomatic immunity—personal representation,
extraterritoriality, and functional necessity.99 A retroactive grant of
diplomatic immunity does not promote the diplomat personifying the power
and sanctity of the royal prince because the individual seeking a retroactive
application never actually represented the foreign government—or
“prince”—in connection with the conduct the individual seeks to
immunize.100 Extraterritoriality, for its part, refers to the legal fiction that the
diplomat does not actually reside in the receiving state but rather is a
passerby not subject to local law.101 Although true diplomats may not be
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, they are typically subject to
the jurisdiction of their home countries.102 This would also be the case for a
person seeking retroactive diplomatic immunity, but the pragmatic
consequences would likely be much different. Because the diplomat would
be immune in the United States after committing the conduct in question
and—even where the act is a crime in the sending state—would not likely be
prosecuted in the same foreign country that just granted the individual a
major favor in the form of diplomatic status, such an individual could

97. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, pmbl. (emphasis omitted)
(emphasis added). The legislative history of the Diplomatic Relations Act similarly supports this purpose.
See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 45, at 32 (“I approve
of the scope of diplomatic immunity provided by the Vienna Convention and recognize that the purpose
of such immunity is not to benefit individuals, but to insure the efficient performance of diplomatic
duties.” (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias)).
98. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, pmbl. Arguably, however,
retroactive grants of diplomatic immunity may promote international peace by avoiding conflicts over an
individual’s diplomatic status.
99. These theories are discussed in depth supra Part I.A.
100. See DAVID B. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A CASE FOR A
UNIVERSAL STATUTE 47–48 (1971) (explaining the theory of personal representation).
101. Yu-Long Ling, A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations
Member Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities of Diplomatic
Agents, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 93–94 (1976) (“Exterritoriality means that diplomatic envoys must
be treated as if they are still living in the territory of the sending state.”).
102. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 136 (“A limitation on diplomatic immunity . . . lies in the lack
of immunity of all diplomats from the jurisdiction and laws of their own governments.”).
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potentially evade all consequences for his or her wrongdoing. Finally,
retroactive diplomatic immunity fails under the theory of functional
necessity for the simple reason that the individual seeking immunity could
not have been performing functions needing protection when the alleged
wrongful conduct occurred, as the individual was not in fact a diplomat
performing diplomatic services.103
B. Reviewability of State Department Certificates and the Political
Question Doctrine
Despite the fact that retroactive diplomatic immunity cuts against the
very purpose of the Vienna Convention, it may nonetheless prevail in court.
This is because, under the political question doctrine, “some issues which
prima facie and by usual criteria would seem to be for the courts, will not be
decided by them but, extra-ordinarily, [are] left for political decision.”104 In
Baker v. Carr,105 the Supreme Court spelled out six factors courts should
consider when determining whether a case is justiciable under the political
question doctrine.106 These include “a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department . . . or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the issue]”
and several prudential factors.107 In recent years, however, the Supreme
Court has disregarded the prudential concerns in favor of the first two
factors.108 The political question doctrine arose primarily out of a concern
for separation of powers.109 Yet some critics consider the doctrine an
objectionable dereliction of federal courts’ Article III duties.110
Invoking the political question doctrine, federal courts have long
deferred to the executive branch on questions of foreign relations,111
103. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text (discussing functional necessity).
104. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599 (1976).
105. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
106. Id. at 217.
107. Id. The prudential concerns that favor finding a case nonjusticiable under the political question
doctrine include “the impossibility of deciding [the issue] without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,” “an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,” and “the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id.
108. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 66; see also infra notes 249–50 and accompanying
text (discussing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189 (2012)).
109. Henkin, supra note 104, at 597.
110. See infra notes 242–49 and accompanying text (examining criticisms of the political question
doctrine).
111. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(“[C]ourts cannot reconsider the wisdom of discretionary foreign policy decisions.”); see also Beth
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including whether an individual is a diplomat entitled to diplomatic
immunity.112 In fact, courts have held that diplomatic status is established by
a mere recognition of such by the State Department and that courts should
not assess the facts when such certification exists113—even in the presence
of potential fraud.114 Although the vast majority of State Department
certifications of diplomatic status are valid,115 there are a number of reasons
why the State Department might—knowingly or otherwise—enable
retroactive diplomatic immunity. These may include the State Department’s
own genuine error, lack of resources, information asymmetry regarding the
individual’s wrongdoing prior to the request for diplomatic status,116 the
State Department’s desire to avoid a foreign-relations debacle over a single
individual’s diplomatic status,117 or corruption.118

Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2710
(2011) (“In cases touching upon foreign affairs, the courts generally give deference to the views of the
Executive Branch . . . .”).
112. See, e.g., In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 421 (1890) (“[T]he certificate of the Secretary of State . . . is
the best evidence to prove the diplomatic character of a person . . . .”); United States v. Lumumba, 741
F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[R]ecognition by the executive branch—not to be second-guessed by the
judiciary—is essential to establishing diplomatic status.”); Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (“It is enough that an ambassador has requested immunity, that the State Department has
recognized that the person for whom it was requested is entitled to it, and that the Department’s
recognition has been communicated to the court.”); De Sousa v. Dep’t of State, 840 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106
(D.D.C. 2012) (“The plaintiff’s entitlement to immunity, however, is a political question that lies beyond
the competence of this Court.”).
113. See Ali v. Dist. Dir., 743 F. App’x 354, 358 (11th Cir. 2018) (“In the United States in particular,
a person’s diplomatic status is established when it is recognized by the Department of State.” (quotations
and citations omitted)); Zdravkovich v. Consul Gen. of Yugoslavia, No. 98-7034, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
15466, at *2 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1998) (per curiam) (“The courts are required to accept the State
Department’s determination that a foreign official possesses diplomatic immunity from suit.” (emphasis
added)).
114. See Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 497 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194 (D.D.C. 2007) (rejecting the possibility
of fraud as an exception to diplomatic immunity that would allow a court to revoke or question a
diplomat’s status).
115. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFF. OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, ACCREDITATION POLICY
HANDBOOK (2018) (explaining the State Department’s extensive accreditation process).
116. Cf. Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce & Colum Lynch, How the Trump Administration Broke the
State Department, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 31, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/how-thetrump-administration-broke-the-state-department [https://perma.cc/R5QG-FWT9] (discussing the firing
of a number of State Department employees, the “White House . . . slashing [the State Department’s]
budget,” and a number of crucial positions left unfilled).
117. See, e.g., Ellen Barry, India Tires of Diplomatic Rift over Arrest of Devyani Khobragade, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/india-tires-of-diplomatic-riftover-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/4D5H-JG6J] (providing an example where the State Department
granted an individual diplomatic status for foreign-policy reasons).
118. Cf. Devan Cole, US Government Scores Worst Mark Since 2011 in Global Corruption Survey,
CNN (Jan. 29, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/29/politics/us-corruptionrating/index.html [https://perma.cc/M6WC-AEFT] (discussing corruption in the U.S. government); Jay
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Although this potential for error exists, federal courts have continued to
dismiss cases involving State Department certifications—even where said
certifications were both legally and factually dubious.119 This Section
discusses two cases, Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County120 and United
States v. Khobragade,121 in which the Eleventh Circuit and Southern District
of New York, respectively, implicitly refused to address whether diplomatic
immunity can be sustained when such status has been retroactively afforded
by the State Department. These two cases, which are the only federal or state
cases involving a retroactive application of diplomatic immunity,122
demonstrate that despite the absurdity of such an application under the
Vienna Convention,123 lack of judicial review enables this conduct to persist.
1. Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County. In late February 1982, a
Florida State Attorney’s office obtained a warrant to search Turki bin
Abdulaziz’s home, on the basis that Abdulaziz was holding a woman there
“against her will.”124 The State Attorney’s office obtained the search warrant
only after learning from the U.S. State Department that Abdulaziz, a member
of the Saudi royal family, did not have diplomatic immunity.125 When police

Cost, The Swamp Isn’t Easy To Drain, ATLANTIC (July 14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2018/07/the-swamp-isnt-easy-to-drain/565151 [https://
perma.cc/M6WC-AEFT] (same); Ayesha Rascoe, Trump Says He’s Concerned About Corruption, but
Advocates
Say
His
Record
Is
Weak,
NPR
(Oct.
9,
2019,
5:43
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/09/768134196/trump-says-hes-concerned-about-corruption-but-advocates-sayhis-record-is-weak [https://perma.cc/A77R-M9MV] (same).
119. See, e.g., Fun v. Pulgar, 993 F. Supp. 2d 470, 473–74 (D.N.J. 2014) (disregarding the fact that
the defendant’s post as a diplomat may have been terminated by the sending state prior to the case at
hand).
120. Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cty., 741 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1984).
121. United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
122. These cases were discovered by combing through the results of the following Westlaw search:
“adv: “diplomatic immunity”.” There is arguably one other federal case that involves a retroactive
application of diplomatic immunity. See generally Republic of Phil. v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793 (N.D.
Cal. 1987). However, this Note does not discuss Marcos as it is actually a case of foreign sovereign
official immunity, and therefore is not applicable. See id. at 795 (involving a subpoena served upon the
Filipino Solicitor General regarding a lawsuit filed against the former president of the Philippines). Other
grants of retroactive grants of diplomatic immunity may exist, perhaps unknown and unpublished because
the plaintiff or government failed to pursue claims in light of the potential defendant’s new diplomatic
status.
123. See supra Part II.A.
124. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1330.
125. Id. Abdulaziz was the brother of King Salman of Saudi Arabia and had last worked in the Saudi
Arabian government approximately four years prior to the conduct and case at issue. See Condolences
Pour in from Across World on Death of Prince Turki bin Abdulaziz, ARAB NEWS (Nov. 14, 2016, 12:00
AM), http://www.arabnews.com/node/1010556/saudi-arabia [https://perma.cc/X2WB-Z5BT] (noting
that Abdulaziz served as Saudi Arabia’s “deputy minister of defense from 1968 to 1978”).
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officers showed up at Abdulaziz’s home to execute the warrant, they were
met with armed guards, and a kerfuffle ensued.126
On March 2, 1982, Abdulaziz and his family brought suit against
Miami-Dade County and the police officers involved in the search, alleging
violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.127 The
defendant police officers then counterclaimed on March 11, 1982, “alleging
injuries from the encounter.”128 However, on April 1, 1982, at the request of
the Saudi government and a few weeks after the counterclaim was filed, the
State Department then certified that Abdulaziz and his family were entitled
to diplomatic status.129 At that point, Abdulaziz moved to dismiss both his
complaint and the defendants’ counterclaim on grounds of diplomatic
immunity from suit.130 The defendants argued that the counterclaim should
not be dismissed, “assert[ing] that the immunity was unsubstantiated
[and] . . . waived.”131
The court held that the State Department’s certification of Abdulaziz’s
diplomatic status, after the alleged wrongdoing occurred and after the trial
had already begun, was determinative.132 It did not matter that the State
Department had affirmed Abdulaziz’s lack of diplomatic status leading up to
the attempted search of his home.133 It did not matter that Abdulaziz had not
carried out any diplomatic functions while living in the United States.134 And
it did not matter that, for all intents and purposes, Abdulaziz was not a
diplomat.135
Rather, the court relied on language from the Senate Report on the
Diplomatic Relations Act, which “indictate[d] that § 254d [of the Act]
intend[ed] dismissal by a court . . . of any action or proceeding where

126. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1330. Although the facts are unclear as to what happened at Abdulaziz’s
home, some have characterized it as a “brawl.” See Gregory Jaynes, Royal Saudi Family in Miami Shows
It Has a Gift for Giving, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/27/us/royal-saudifamily-in-miami-shows-it-has-a-gift-for-giving.html [https://perma.cc/AM8H-J4KC]. One of the police
officers claimed he was “kicked and spat upon.” Id.
127. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1330.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Abdulaziz likely moved to dismiss his own complaint as well because, under the Diplomatic
Relations Act, filing an initial complaint constitutes waiver of diplomatic immunity in regard to any
resulting counterclaims. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
131. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1330.
132. See id. at 1332 (regarding Abdulaziz’s later grant of immunity as conclusive).
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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immunity is found to exist.”136 The court found that the State Department
certification was enough to satisfy this “existence” requirement because—
presumably under the political question doctrine—“courts have generally
accepted as conclusive the views of the State Department as to the fact of
diplomatic status.”137 The court further based its reasoning on the fact that
Abdulaziz was eligible for but had not yet “been granted diplomatic status at
the time he initiated his . . . suit,”138 all the while disregarding that,
theoretically, thousands of nondiplomats would similarly be eligible.139
In its affirmance of the district court’s dismissal of the case, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that “once the . . . Department of State has
regularly certified a visitor . . . as having diplomatic status, the courts are
bound to accept that determination, and that the diplomatic
immunity . . . serves as a defense to suits already commenced.”140 And so,
despite irregular evidence, the Eleventh Circuit refused to analyze the facts
in concluding that Abdulaziz was someone who was “regularly certified” as
a diplomat so as to necessitate dismissal.141
Following this decision, Abdulaziz has been routinely cited for the
proposition that courts must accord substantial deference to State
Department determinations of diplomatic status.142 However, no federal or
136. Id. at 1331 (quotations and citation omitted).
137. Id. Although the court is relatively conclusory in its opinion and does not expressly state that it
is dismissing the case on political question grounds, practically, it is. Courts often view issues relating to
foreign affairs as nonjusticiable political questions warranting dismissal. See PETER W. LOW, JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
482 (9th ed. 2018) (“In Baker v. Carr, the [Supreme] Court acknowledged that foreign affairs was an area
where the political question doctrine might have particular salience.”); see also Linda Champlin & Alan
Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV.
215, 217 (1985) (noting that although the political question doctrine “has been cut back in other areas,
the doctrine is thriving and growing in its application to the foreign relations power.”). Although the
outcome of dismissal is the same, over time, courts have differed in how they describe the treatment of
cases involving foreign affairs. For example, “[i]n some cases, . . . the courts simply treat[] the
government’s decision as an unreviewable fact. In others, as with those that challenge[] the powers of
particular branches of government, the courts abstain[] from hearing the case altogether.” Harlan Grant
Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 11 (2017).
138. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1331.
139. The State Department itself claims—perhaps facetiously—that “everyone” can be a diplomat.
Who Else Can Be a Diplomat? Everyone!, U.S. DEP’T STATE: DISCOVER DIPLOMACY,
https://diplomacy.state.gov/diplomacy/who-else-can-be-a-diplomat-everyone [https://perma.cc/75JYUCWL]. The Vienna Convention itself does not specify any absolute requirements for an individual to
qualify as a diplomat. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42 (lacking
any mention of education or work-experience requirements, for example).
140. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1329–30 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
State Department has wide discretion in classifying diplomats).
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state court relied on Abdulaziz for the proposition that diplomatic immunity
may apply retroactively for persons who arguably are not diplomats and were
not diplomats at the time of the act in controversy for another thirty years,
until the Khobragade scandal.
2. United States v. Khobragade. On December 12, 2013, Devyani
Khobragade, a deputy consul general at the Indian consulate in New York
City, was arrested on charges of “visa fraud and making false statements to
the government,”143 causing a veritable “diplomatic rift” between India and
the United States.144 Immediately following the arrest, Indian news outlets
decried Khobragade’s arrest,145 leading to Indian officials removing the
security barriers around the U.S. Embassy in India and revoking certain
privileges accorded to U.S. diplomats.146 The scandal culminated in the
resignation of U.S. Ambassador to India Nancy Jo Powell.147 The Indian
media particularly condemned the fact that Khobragade was arrested,
handcuffed, strip-searched, and kept in a holding cell before being released
on bond,148 something U.S. officials said was simply standard protocol.149
Looking behind the relatively mundane charge of visa fraud, the reality
of Khobragade’s offense is far more troubling. The visa in question was
obtained for Khobragade’s domestic worker, Sangeeta Richard.150 Richard
immigrated to the United States from India to work as Khobragade’s

143. United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
144. Ellen Barry, India Tires of Diplomatic Rift over Arrest of Devyani Khobragade, N.Y TIMES
(Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/india-tires-of-diplomatic-rift-overarrest.html [https://perma.cc/ZDA3-ZECL].
145. See, e.g., Namrata Brar, Devyani Khobragade Case: She Was Strip Searched ‘Like Other
Arrestees’ Say US Marshals, NDTV (Dec. 18, 2013, 7:09 PM), https://www.ndtv.com/indianews/devyani-khobragade-case-she-was-strip-searched-like-other-arrestees-say-us-marshals-544910
[https://perma.cc/RE66-ZL78] (describing Khobragade’s arrest as inexplicable and humiliating); Arpita
De, Who Is Devyani Khobragade?, TIMES INDIA (Dec. 20, 2013, 7:09 PM),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Who-is-Devyani-Khobragade/articleshow/27659238.cms
[https://perma.cc/KK5R-FL7R] (characterizing Khobragade’s arrest and its aftermath as “an assault on
her person and her reputation”).
146. In the midst of the Khobragade affair, Indian officials revoked the U.S. Embassy’s “food and
alcohol import privileges” and the right of American consular employees to be free from arrest for certain
offenses. Barry & Weiser, supra note 81.
147. See Barry, supra note 144 (noting that Ambassador Powell’s resignation “was widely seen here
as fallout from the imbroglio”).
148. Barry & Weiser, supra note 81.
149. Gardiner Harris, Outrage in India, and Retaliation, over a Female Diplomat’s Arrest in New
York, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/asia/outrage-in-indiaover-female-diplomats-arrest-in-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/H7JR-N8SJ].
150. Barry & Weiser, supra note 81.
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childcare provider and occasional housekeeper.151 In obtaining an A-3 visa
on Richard’s behalf, Khobragade confirmed to the U.S. government that
Richard’s working conditions would comply with U.S. labor laws, meaning
she would pay Richard at least minimum wage and overtime when
applicable.152 But Richard did not receive even the bare minimum. Rather,
Richard was often forced to work over one hundred hours per week—with
no days off—and at an hourly wage of $1.42.153 Contrary to what
Khobragade maintained in the visa application, Richard did not receive any
holidays, sick days, or vacation days.154 Khobragade also declined to return
Richard’s passport to her “despite several requests” to do so.155 After
Khobragade refused to pay Richard $9.75 per hour—the wage stipulated in
the employment contract presented to the U.S. government—or terminate
Richard’s employment and allow her to return to India as she requested on
several occasions, Richard fled.156
Richard is not alone in the treatment she endured while working for
Khobragade. In fact, the trafficking and abuse of domestic workers by
foreign officials has become an issue in the United States.157 In the last
decade, domestic workers have filed approximately twenty lawsuits against
diplomats and other foreign envoys living in the United States.158 This
number likely does not represent the scope of the problem, as cases often go
unreported and “[s]ome workers may only rarely be allowed to leave the
home or make contact with outsiders, or may have little knowledge of their
rights.”159 Despite the severity of these circumstances, some commentators

151. Indictment at 3–7, United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14Crim-008) [hereinafter Indictment].
152. Id. at 3–4.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 10, 14.
155. Id. (alleging that during one conversation, Khobragade told Richard she would only return her
passport once her three-year employment elapsed, in violation of U.S. law).
156. Id. at 16.
157. See Vandenberg & Bessell, supra note 67, at 596–99 (explaining that “many diplomatic
trafficking cases are never criminally prosecuted” and that significant improvement is needed in the
enforcement of such cases). Research from the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. shows
that domestic workers employed by foreign officials commonly “have their passports taken away, [are]
barred from contacting friends[,] and . . . earn salaries of $100 to $400 a month.” Somini Sengupta, An
Immigrant’s Legal Enterprise; In Suing Employer, Maid Fights Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
12,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/12/nyregion/immigrant-s-legal-enterprise-suingemployer-maid-fights-diplomatic-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/B4KH-85GV].
158. Benjamin Weiser & Vivian Yee, Claim Against Indian Diplomat Has Echoes of Previous Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/nyregion/claims-of-diplomatsmistreating-household-staff-are-far-from-the-first.html [https://perma.cc/34DU-KNB3].
159. Id.
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explain away the mistreatment of domestic workers as merely a difference
in culture.160
But Richard’s case was reported, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of New York filed an indictment against Khobragade on
January 9, 2014.161 Khobragade promptly moved to dismiss the indictment,
claiming diplomatic immunity162 even though she was a consular officer—
not a diplomat—when she allegedly violated U.S. law, when she was being
investigated, and when she was arrested.163 Consuls are entitled to
significantly lesser protections under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, at least partially because “[c]onsular officials are . . . thought of
as administrators, rather than diplomats.”164 The Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations immunizes consuls only as to their official acts, and,
unlike diplomats, they may be arrested and detained under certain
circumstances.165 Also unlike diplomats, the property of consular officers
may be searched under the appropriate constitutional restraints, and consular
immunity does not extend to a consul’s family members.166 Therefore, when,
as a consular officer, Khobragade allegedly committed visa fraud and made
false statements to the government, she was not immune from arrest or
prosecution for such actions.167

160. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 149. Harris argues that “[i]t is not unusual in India for domestic
staff to be paid poorly and be required to work more than 60 hours a week,” and “[r]eports of maids being
imprisoned or abused by their employers are frequent.” Id. On the other hand, “the idea of a middle-class
woman being arrested and ordered to disrobe is seen as shocking. Airport security procedures in India
provide separate lines for women, and any pat-down searches are performed behind curtains.” Id.
161. Indictment, supra note 151, at 1.
162. United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
163. See id. at 383–84 (“Khobragade . . . served as a consular officer in the United States from
October 26, 2012 through January 8, 2014, a position that cloaked her with consular immunity . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
164. Savage, supra note 82; accord IRVIN STEWART, CONSULAR PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 9
(1926) (“The consular regulations of many states expressly provide that the consul has no diplomatic
character and forbid the invoking of the privileges of diplomatic agents.”). Typical functions of consular
personnel include the “issuance of travel documents, attending to the difficulties of their own countrymen
who are in the host country, and generally promoting the commerce of the sending country.” DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 10.
165. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 6–7 (explaining that consuls may be
arrested for felonies when the arresting officer has a proper warrant).
166. Id. at 7.
167. Under the indictment, the alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1546 are felonies carrying
sentences up to eight and fifteen years in prison, respectively. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1006, 1546 (2018);
Indictment, supra note 151, at 19–20; Heather Timmons, Now That Devyani Khobragade Is Leaving the
US, Is This the End of US-India Tensions?, QUARTZ (Jan. 9, 2014), https://qz.com/165510/will-devyanikhobragades-departure-from-the-us-signal-the-end-of-us-india-tensions [https://perma.cc/5EA3-AB7H].

RAPHAEL IN PRINTER FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/20/2020 11:19 AM

1448

[Vol. 69:1425

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

However, on January 8, 2014, one day before the U.S. government filed
its indictment against Khobragade—almost a month after her arrest and at
least one year after the alleged wrongdoing began—the Indian government
promoted Khobragade to a position that would cloak her with diplomatic
status and its corresponding privileges.168 The next day, Khobragade
returned to India, in turn divesting her of the purported diplomatic
immunity.169 The U.S. government argued against Khobragade’s motion to
dismiss on the ground that Khobragade was not a diplomat entitled to
diplomatic immunity when she was arrested.170 The government supported
this contention with a statement by Stephen Kerr, an Attorney-Adviser at the
U.S. State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser, who asserted that
“Khobragade did not enjoy immunity from arrest or detention at the time of
her arrest” and “does not presently enjoy immunity from prosecution for the
crimes charged in the Indictment.”171 The court found Kerr’s declaration
irrelevant, focusing rather on the fact that all parties, including the State
Department, conceded that Khobragade was a diplomat on a single day:
January 9, 2014, which also happened to be the day the indictment was
filed.172 The court disregarded Khobragade’s status at the time of her arrest,
instead relying on a prior State Department pronouncement that “criminal
immunity precludes the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts over an
individual whether the incident occurred prior to or during the period in
which such immunity exists.”173 The court similarly found the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Abdulaziz to stand for the position that “diplomatic
immunity acquired during the pendency of proceedings destroys jurisdiction
even if the suit was validly commenced before immunity applied.”174 The
court declined to consider whether Khobragade was in fact a diplomat or
whether Khobragade ever acted as a diplomat.175 The court also did not
entertain why the State Department granted Khobragade diplomatic
immunity for that single day in January or whether such an action was

168. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 384.
169. Id. at 386. When a foreign diplomat exits the United States, his or her diplomatic immunities
and privileges customarily cease to exist. DENZA, supra note 19, at 354.
170. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 387.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 386–87 (“Even assuming Kerr’s conclusions to be correct, the case must be dismissed
based on Khobragade’s conceded immunity on January 9, 2014.”).
173. Id. at 387 (quoting DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 15).
174. See id. (explaining Abdulaziz provides “that diplomatic immunity serves as a defense to suits
already commenced” (quotations omitted)). The court did not find the fact that the Abdulaziz case
comprehended civil rather than criminal charges to be determinative. Id. at 388.
175. Id. at 387–88.
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lawful.176 Instead, the court dismissed the indictment, concluding that
diplomatic immunity is simply “a jurisdictional bar” warranting “dismiss[al
of the] proceedings the moment immunity is acquired.”177 And so, for a
second time, a federal court allowed a retroactive grant of diplomatic
immunity in the name of following particular State Department
determinations.178
C. Abuse of Retroactive Diplomatic Immunity
The principal problem with a retroactive application of diplomatic
immunity is its potential for unfettered abuse. In both Abdulaziz and
Khobragade, individuals were successfully able to garner diplomatic
immunity after having allegedly committed serious crimes ranging from
false imprisonment to mistreatment of domestic workers.179 The fact that
courts have allowed such retroactive grants of diplomatic immunity enables
its abuse. Recall the earlier hypothetical involving Monsieur Rich.180 Simply
by virtue of his contact with a corrupt foreign government official, Madame
Shady, who was then able to designate him as a foreign attaché, Monsieur
Rich was able to immunize his past money laundering. This is all in spite of
the fact that Monsieur Rich never acted as a diplomat and likely never would
have performed any diplomatic functions.
German tennis star and six-time Grand Slam titleholder, Boris Becker,
attempted a similar scheme in 2018.181 Faced with creditors and bankruptcy
in the United Kingdom, Becker pulled a trick right out of Monsieur Rich’s
playbook and claimed diplomatic immunity from the English court’s
jurisdiction.182 Becker informed the High Court in London that since the
inception of its bankruptcy proceedings, the Central African Republic had
appointed Becker to “Attaché to the European Union on sporting, cultural

176. See id. (lacking any explicit discussion to this effect). The State Department’s grant of
diplomatic immunity to Khobragade has widely been seen as a move to assuage Indian anger in response
to the incident, especially considering the State Department’s request that India waive the immunity and
that Khobragade leave the country. See Barry, supra note 144 (“In an effort to resolve the dispute, the
State Department granted Ms. Khobragade diplomatic immunity and told her to leave the country.”).
177. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 388.
178. See id. at 385 (summarizing the conception of the political question doctrine shared by other
federal courts, providing that “where a person’s diplomatic status is contested, courts generally consider
the State Department’s determination to be conclusive”).
179. See supra Part II.B (discussing the two cases).
180. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
181. Richard Pérez-Peña, Boris Becker Is an African Diplomat? His Creditors Are First To Know,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/world/europe/boris-beckerdiplomatic-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/M88C-QFDB].
182. Id.
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and humanitarian affairs,” a position he claimed immunized him from his
past debts.183 In one interview, Becker candidly revealed that his reason for
claiming diplomatic status was to evade the bankruptcy proceedings: “I have
now asserted diplomatic immunity as I am in fact bound to do, in order to
bring this farce to an end, so that I can start to rebuild my life.”184 The Central
African Republic, for its part, is perceived as one of the most corrupt
countries in the world.185 The Central African Republic’s own officials could
not even agree on whether Becker was indeed an attaché.186 But without
waiting for a court’s ruling, Becker dropped his claim of diplomatic
immunity,187 perhaps due to the media attention it garnered when Becker
may have preferred to go undetected.
Not every case will be as high profile as Boris Becker’s. Still, the idea
that diplomatic status may be so gameable is wholly contrary to the purposes
of diplomatic immunity.188 The fact that diplomatic immunity can be
accorded retroactively, once an individual has already committed a wrongful
act and has had time to drum up ways to evade prosecution or suit, enables
its abuse. Federal courts might do well to take note of this when faced with
individuals whose diplomatic status is a genuine question of fact.
D. Retroactive Applications of Other Forms of Immunity
Diplomatic status is not the only legal mechanism providing immunities
for certain allegedly wrongful acts—although it is likely the most expansive.
Presidential immunity, qualified immunity, and defense witness immunity
all immunize the holder from prosecution or suit. In comparing these three

183. Ben Emmerson (@BenEmmerson1), TWITTER (June 14, 2018, 11:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/BenEmmerson1/status/1007323893433098241
[https://perma.cc/6RRF-AK8L]
(statement of Boris Becker’s attorney).
184. Alexander Britton, Boris Becker Claims Diplomatic Immunity To Avoid Bankruptcy,
INDEPENDENT (June 15, 2018, 1:42 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/borisbecker-diplomatic-immunity-bankruptcy-a8399731.html [https://perma.cc/F2MK-4XZ7].
185. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/
cpi2018 [https://perma.cc/9KMZ-68FX] (ranking 149 out of 180 for most corrupt, where the 180th
country is perceived to be the most corrupt country in the world).
186. See Siobhán O’Grady, Boris Becker Claims To Be a Central African Diplomat. Officials Say
His Passport Is a Fake, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/20/boris-becker-claims-to-be-a-central-african-diplomat-officialsthere-say-his-passport-is-a-fake [https://perma.cc/4LLA-5PB3] (explaining that the Central African
Republic’s Ambassador to the European Union confirmed Becker’s diplomatic status while other country
officials indicated Becker’s diplomatic passport was fake).
187. Former Tennis Star Boris Becker Drops Immunity Claim, AP NEWS (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://apnews.com/ce6c0169a6524be995cef12e659f3273 [https://perma.cc/564H-NXX7].
188. See supra Part II.A (explaining the policy rationales against such an application of diplomatic
immunity).
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instruments, none allow for a retroactive grant of immunity in the way that
courts have enabled for diplomatic immunity. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
previously explicitly denied retroactive application of presidential
immunity189—a position that would appear much less manipulable than that
of diplomats considering that one would have to be elected by millions to
attain it.
Historically, courts dismissed any case involving the U.S. president,190
much like courts now dismiss suits filed against diplomats.191 The Watergate
Scandal changed this. In United States v. Nixon,192 the Supreme Court held
that, in some circumstances, the president may be appropriately subjected to
judicial processes.193 Yet, the Supreme Court has held that the president has
complete immunity when acting “within the outer perimeter of his [or her]
official duties.”194 Rather than prosecution or suit, the response to serious,
official presidential misconduct is impeachment.195 A primary purpose of
presidential immunity revolves around “the idea that the constitutional
orientation of a President’s responsibilities requires him [or her] to act, and
those actions should be as unencumbered as possible.”196 Much like
diplomatic immunity, the objective of presidential immunity is to allow the
president to effectively perform his or her discretionary functions, without
needing to repeatedly analyze them for possible liability.197
Unlike diplomatic immunity, the Supreme Court has actually heard a
case involving the retroactive application of presidential immunity. In
Clinton v. Jones,198 the Court held that presidential immunity does not apply
retroactively to actions taken before the president took office.199 In 1994,
189. See infra notes 198–205 and accompanying text.
190. Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential
Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (1983).
191. See supra notes 104–14 and accompanying text.
192. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
193. See id. at 697 (finding justiciable a subpoena of President Nixon’s tape recordings).
194. Douglas B. McKechnie, @POTUS: Rethinking Presidential Immunity in the Time of Twitter,
72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) (quotations omitted) (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756
(1982)).
195. See Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 100 (2000) (“Immunity from judicial process does not place the President above the
law. The existence and breadth of impeachment . . . assure that the President is not above the law.”). In
practice, punishment for presidential misconduct has historically come through unofficial channels,
including “failure of reelection, or through trashing of the President’s . . . image.” Carter, supra note 190,
at 1341.
196. McKechnie, supra note 194, at 25.
197. Id.
198. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
199. See infra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.

RAPHAEL IN PRINTER FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/20/2020 11:19 AM

1452

[Vol. 69:1425

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a sexual
harassment suit against President Bill Clinton.200 Although Clinton was
president when Jones instituted the lawsuit, the alleged sexual harassment
occurred prior to his presidency, when Clinton was Governor of Arkansas.201
In response to Jones’s suit, President Clinton filed a motion to dismiss on
presidential-immunity grounds.202 The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court and the Eighth Circuit’s denial of the motion to dismiss, explaining that
the president is not entitled to immunity for unofficial acts taken before the
president took office.203 The Court then concluded that it would be a matter
for Congress to extend presidential immunity to actions taken in an unofficial
capacity.204 And so, despite the broad immunity granted to U.S. presidents,205
the Supreme Court has declined to authorize retroactive grants of
presidential immunity.
Other state and federal government officials are also entitled to limited
immunities. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, state and federal
officials are protected from certain civil liabilities when “performing
discretionary functions . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”206 Like diplomatic immunity, the purpose of qualified
immunity is to protect the government official’s functions and not the
individual in his or her personal capacity.207 With this purpose in mind,
qualified immunity thus shields a government official only as to actions
taken under the scope of the individual’s employment.208 Therefore, like with
presidential immunity,209 a retroactive grant of qualified immunity would be
unworkable. Actions taken before the individual became a government
official are definitionally beyond the scope of employment and could not
have been taken while performing official functions. Therefore, such actions
could not be immunized.

200. Jones, 520 U.S. at 684–85.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 686.
203. See id. at 691–96, 710 (holding that functional immunity extends only to actions taken under
office).
204. Id. at 709.
205. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
206. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
207. Id. at 807 (“[T]he recognition of a qualified immunity defense . . . reflected an attempt . . . to
protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging
the vigorous exercise of official authority.” (quotations omitted)).
208. Id. at 818.
209. See supra notes 190–205 and accompanying text (discussing presidential immunity).
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Finally, defense witness immunity was established as a response to the
Fifth Amendment bar against compelling an individual to provide selfincriminating testimony.210 Because of the Fifth Amendment’s “broad
scope,” the government saw it as a significant barrier to obtaining
evidence.211 Defense witness immunity is used as a means of overcoming
this barrier212 and is especially useful in prosecutions of organized crime and
political corruption.213 Over time, two forms of defense witness immunity
have arisen: transactional immunity and use immunity.214 Transactional
immunity grants defense witnesses absolute immunity from prosecution for
any crime—or transaction—brought up in the compelled witness’s
testimony.215 This form of defense witness immunity became problematic,
as it was so expansive that it was “easily abused.”216 Witnesses could, for
example, “skillfully provoke[] a line of inquiry that allowed them to establish
a complete record of their crimes and thus secure broad immunity.”217 This
led to a shift in the late twentieth century toward use immunity,218 which
immunizes the witness only to the extent that his or her testimony may not
be used as evidence to later develop a case against the witness.219
What is interesting about defense witness immunity is that from an
initial perspective, it may appear as though its whole premise is retroactive
in nature—the defense witness was not a witness when the wrongful act in
question took place, and yet later receives immunity for that act. However,
use immunity is better thought of as immunizing the witness’s testimony, and
not the actions themselves.220 From that angle, the individual is already a

210. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . . .”); Robin Deborah Mass, Note, Witness for the Defense: A Right to Immunity, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1667–68 (1981).
211. Mass, supra note 210, at 1667.
212. Id. at 1668.
213. Clifford S. Fishman, Defense Witness As “Accomplice”: Should the Trial Judge Give a “Care
and Caution” Instruction?, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (2005) (explaining that testimony by an
accomplice is useful in the prosecution of organized crime and political corruption).
214. James F. Flanagan, Compelled Immunity for Defense Witnesses: Hidden Costs and Questions,
56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448–50 (1981) (providing an overview of the transition between
transactional and use immunity).
215. Mass, supra note 210, at 1669.
216. See id. at 1672 (discussing one particular transactional-immunity statute).
217. Id.
218. See Rita Werner Gordon, Right to Immunity for Defense Witnesses, 20 CONN. L. REV. 153, 159
(1987) (“A shift away from transactional immunity occurred in 1970 when Congress passed the Federal
Immunity of Witnesses Act.”).
219. Mass, supra note 210, at 1669.
220. See Peter Lushing, Testimonial Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Study
in Isomorphism, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1690, 1690–92 (1982) (explaining that to bypass the
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witness when the immunity is granted. And even in those rare cases where
transactional immunity applies, having it apply to actions before the
individual became a witness cannot be untethered from the concept of
defense witness immunity—it would theoretically be impossible to designate
someone as a future witness. To assume otherwise would be contrary to the
fundamental nature of transactional immunity. Thus, courts should pause
before denying review of retroactive grants of diplomatic immunity under
the political question doctrine, as retroactive grants of analogous forms of
immunity have either been expressly disapproved of by the Supreme Court
or appear irreconcilable with their basic purposes.
III. THE SOLUTION TO RETROACTIVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
All three branches of the federal government have the ability to address
the problem of retroactive diplomatic immunity. The executive branch could
continue its current efforts of limiting abuses of diplomatic immunity
generally through State Department designations of diplomats as personae
non gratae and requests for waiver. Congress could pass a statute requiring
sending states to provide a list of all diplomats so as to determine immunities
ex ante and avoid retroactive applications altogether. But neither of those
approaches would prove as effortless or effective as a judicial solution.
Because the known retroactive applications of diplomatic immunity have
depended on the federal courts’ deference to the State Department on matters
of foreign affairs, the judiciary could narrowly interpret the political question
doctrine in cases involving diplomatic immunity. This would not only
provide a means by which judges and juries could make legal and factual
determinations as to whether an individual is indeed a diplomat entitled to
diplomatic immunity, but also align diplomatic immunity with the
retroactive treatment of other forms of immunity.221
A. The Executive Solution
One potential approach to the issue of retroactive diplomatic immunity
would be to rely on existing remedies already designed to curb abuse of
diplomatic immunity. Existing limits include the executive branch’s
designation of an individual as persona non grata and requesting waiver of
an individual’s diplomatic immunity.222 Designating an individual as
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, only the witness’s testimony need be immunized, not
the witness in his or her individual capacity).
221. See supra Part II.D (discussing the retroactive treatment of presidential immunity, qualified
immunity, and defense witness immunity).
222. See supra Part I.C.
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persona non grata effectively expels the diplomat from the receiving state,223
which is especially useful in cases where the diplomat is seen as dangerous
as when he or she has committed a violent crime. However, such a
designation does not provide a way to prosecute or sue the individual in the
receiving state,224 which may leave the victim without a remedy. Requesting
that the sending state waive the individual’s immunities can similarly be
ineffective because sending nations often refuse to grant them.225 States may
be even less likely to grant waivers where the individual’s diplomatic status
was accorded for corrupt means.226 Also, this approach does not necessarily
account for situations in which an individual’s subversive use of a retroactive
application of immunity goes undetected, as it relies entirely on State
Department capabilities. In any case, as seen in Abdulaziz and Khobragade,
the State Department cannot always be relied upon to correctly issue
diplomatic certifications.227
B. The Legislative Solution
A more invasive approach would involve the enforcement of a
diplomatic list requiring sending states to, ex ante, provide receiving states
with a list of all their diplomats. Congress could pass a statute wherein
individuals not on the diplomatic list would be unable to claim any immunity
from civil or criminal prosecution, therefore effectively eradicating any sort
of retroactive application. The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Chief

223. Ross, supra note 41, at 188; see also Philip Bump, How To Be Declared ‘Persona Non Grata’
and Get Yourself Kicked Out of the United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016, 3:51 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/29/how-to-be-declared-a-persona-non
-grata-and-get-yourself-kicked-out-of-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/T3LP-LSLM] (explaining how a
designation of persona non grata effectively banishes a diplomat from the United States).
224. Presidential Power To Expel Diplomatic Personnel, supra note 91, at 207 (omitting the right to
sue or prosecute the individual in the included powers).
225. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. For a recent example of a foreign relations
debacle involving a diplomatic immunity waiver request, see PM’s Plea to US To Rethink Immunity over
Harry Dunn Fatal Crash, BBC (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-englandnorthamptonshire-49961679 [https://perma.cc/7YD8-VRNJ] (involving the death of British teenager
Harry Dunn following a crash allegedly caused by the wife of an American diplomat).
226. For instance, the Indian government denied a waiver request in the course of the Khobragade
scandal. DENZA, supra note 19, at 352.
227. See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of Abdulaziz and Khobragade).
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of Protocol already provides for a version of such a list,228 although it is
neither exhaustive229 nor legally enforceable.230
The problem with requiring an all-encompassing diplomatic list is
threefold. First, countries might not want to divulge all of the agents they
have working in a foreign country.231 For instance, in 2011, the United States
claimed diplomatic immunity over a covert American agent accused of
killing two men in Pakistan.232 The United States had not declared the agent’s
status to Pakistan prior to the incident.233 Classifying the diplomatic list so
that it is unavailable to the public, as is the case in the United Kingdom, 234
might assuage some countries, but others might be concerned with anyone
at all—especially the receiving state—obtaining such information. Second,
a legally determinative diplomatic list would prevent any sort of flexibility
in cases where governments made genuine errors in either naming someone
a diplomat or refraining from doing so.235 Third, unless every name on the
sending state’s list of diplomats is thoroughly vetted, which could prove
costly, some individuals may still attempt to become diplomats through
corrupt means in anticipation of committing a wrongful act.
C. The Judicial Solution
The solution that best resolves the dilemma of retroactive diplomatic
immunity involves courts narrowly construing the political question doctrine
in cases of retroactive diplomatic immunity. As it stands, federal courts
generally defer to State Department certifications of an individual’s
diplomatic status, declining to consider whether the individual functions as
a diplomat or obtained diplomatic status for the purpose of evading the

228. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC LIST (2018), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/287365.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC42-9GHA] [hereinafter DIPLOMATIC LIST].
229. See id. (listing only certain diplomats and their spouses but not diplomats’ dependent children
who may also be entitled to diplomatic immunity).
230. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 86 (“[I]n a court of law[, a diplomatic list] may be only
prima facie evidence, not decisive, and may require supporting testimony from the foreign ministry.”
(emphasis omitted)).
231. See infra notes 232–33 and accompanying text (describing a situation where the United States
abstained from ex ante providing information on an individual’s diplomatic status).
232. Savage, supra note 82.
233. See id. (noting conflicting statements about the agent’s legal status in Pakistan and confusion
over whether he was a consular or diplomatic staff member).
234. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 86.
235. Aside from potential constitutional concerns, this is similarly why a statute prohibiting the State
Department from certifying an individual’s diplomatic status after a civil suit or criminal proceeding has
been instituted would be troublesome.
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consequences of past misconduct.236 Where the plaintiff pleads sufficient
facts that the defendant was not a diplomat when committing the alleged
conduct, or perhaps not even a diplomat when the proceedings began, as in
Abdulaziz,237 federal courts should not mechanically grant the defendant’s
motion to dismiss. This approach would provide at least some means for the
court to determine whether the individual became a diplomat for nefarious
or fraudulent purposes, while continuing to provide courts with discretion in
cases where retroactive diplomatic immunity may be desirable to maintain
peaceful foreign relations.238 Moreover, a narrow reading of the political
question doctrine in cases involving retroactive grants of diplomatic
immunity would harmonize the law of diplomatic immunity with that of
presidential immunity. Because the Supreme Court has clearly held that not
even the U.S. president enjoys retroactive immunity,239 there is no
compelling reason for a diplomat to be afforded as much—especially
considering that the presidency is an almost unobtainable office, whereas
there are theoretically thousands of foreign diplomatic positions available for
exploitation in the United States.240
Legal scholarship has long criticized the political question doctrine. The
main arguments against it include that the doctrine enjoys only an attenuated
textual basis in the Constitution,241 that the executive branch is not always
the best situated to make certain decisions,242 and that it is contrary to one of
the “fundamental tenet[s]” of the U.S. government—that “courts have a core

236. See supra Part II.B (examining two cases in which federal courts allowed retroactive grants of
diplomatic immunity).
237. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Abdulaziz).
238. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (explaining the fallout from the Khobragade
scandal).
239. See supra notes 198–205 and accompanying text.
240. There are likely over six thousand registered foreign diplomats currently living in the United
States. This number was determined by counting all diplomats and their spouses featured in the State
Department’s Diplomatic List, which was last updated in Fall 2018. DIPLOMATIC LIST, supra note 228.
This number does not include spouses who are U.S. nationals, nonspouse family members, or individuals
entitled to consular immunity. Id.
241. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1170, 1202 (2007) (arguing that the textual basis for deference to the executive on foreign relations
matters is “rather sparse and ambiguous”).
242. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002) (maintaining that the
idea “that some constitutional questions ultimately must be decided by the political branches and not
through judicial review . . . is beginning to seem antiquated”); William S. Dodge, International Comity
in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2132 (2015) (“A . . . myth of international comity is the
notion that the executive branch enjoys a comparative advantage in making comity determinations.”).
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responsibility under the Constitution to resolve disputes.”243 Indeed, some
scholars contend that the political question doctrine directly conflicts with
Chief Justice Marshall’s oft-cited axiom from Marbury v. Madison244 that
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”245 And Michael J. Glennon, former Legal Counsel to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the enactment of the Diplomatic
Relations Act of 1978,246 argues that the political question doctrine is
particularly unfit in the arena of foreign affairs:
The unevenness of congressional oversight, the proclivity of executive
foreign affairs agencies for violating the law and the traditional
responsibility of the courts as the last guardians of the Constitution—all
point to the propriety of an active role for the judiciary in ensuring
governmental compliance with the law. Specifically, courts should not
decline to resolve foreign affairs disputes between Congress and the
President because they present “political questions.”247

Glennon explains that without the possibility of judicial review of certain
State Department decisions under the political question doctrine, wrongful
actions go unchecked,248 something wholly at odds with the very essence of
the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Total abandonment of the political question doctrine is unnecessary for
purposes of resolving the issue of retroactive diplomatic immunity. Federal
courts need only provide for a narrow reading of a doctrine that has already
been limited by the Supreme Court.249 As recently as 2012, the Supreme

243. E.g., Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INT’L
L. 814, 815 (1989).
244. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
245. Id. at 177; Glennon, supra note 243, at 815.
246. See Michael J. Glennon, TUFTS: FLETCHER SCH., https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/michael-jglennon [https://perma.cc/T7HY-PWLK] (noting Glennon’s tenure working for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee from 1977 through 1980).
247. Glennon, supra note 243, at 814.
248. Id.
249. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 194–95, 211–12
(2012) (describing the political question doctrine as narrowly applicable); see also Cohen, supra note
137, at 4 (explaining the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the political question doctrine in Zivotofsky I);
Alex Loomis, Why Are the Lower Courts (Mostly) Ignoring Zivotofsky I’s Political Question Analysis?,
LAWFARE (May 19, 2016, 4:23 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-are-lower-courts-mostlyignoring-zivotofsky-political-question-analysis [https://perma.cc/3F7G-ZXC6] (providing an overview
of the Supreme Court’s view of the political question doctrine and subsequent treatment by lower courts).
But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507–08 (2019) (finding a gerrymandering case
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine). Justice Kagan’s dissent in Rucho aptly describes the
ills that may come when the political question doctrine is wrongly employed: “In the face of grievous
harm to democratic governance and flagrant infringements on individuals’ rights . . . the majority declines
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Court refined the political question doctrine so that its invocation
necessitates either “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” to
a political branch, or “a lack of judicially . . . manageable standards.”250
Neither the Constitution nor the text of the Vienna Convention require that
courts defer to the State Department on matters of retroactive diplomatic
immunity.251 Furthermore, courts need only use their preexisting fact-finding
tools to determine whether individuals should be entitled to diplomatic
immunity. District courts could easily follow the Supreme Court’s lead and
not leave cases of inherently erroneous diplomatic immunity to the political
question doctrine. Returning to Monsieur Rich,252 this judicial solution
would provide an opportunity for a court to determine whether Monsieur
Rich factually acted as a diplomat, thus warranting immunity, or whether he
obtained a diplomatic position for the purpose of evading criminal
prosecution. It might also discourage others like Monsieur Rich from
attempting such a scheme in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Diplomatic immunity is an important pillar of international law. Its
abuse by nondiplomats is an unfortunate and unintended consequence of
both the broad language of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
and federal courts’ deference to the State Department on matters of foreign
relations. It remains to be seen whether more cases of retroactive diplomatic
immunity will crop up following the successes of the defendants in Abdulaziz
and Khobragade. Where new cases do arise, however, courts should not feel
compelled to disregard fraud or malfeasance in the name of promoting the
executive branch’s view of diplomacy. Diplomacy concerns the friendly,
open relations between states—not sneaky invocations of immunity.

to provide any remedy.” Id. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting). This is not what federal courts were
established to do. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. Rather, federal courts should be able to
resolve issues of individual rights, such as in the mistreatment of Richard in Khobragade. See supra Part
II.B.2 (discussing Khobragade).
250. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 195 (quotations and citation omitted).
251. See generally U.S. CONST.; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42.
252. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.

